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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The State has made several concessions in this case, but it nevertheless insists that this
Court should not grant relief in light of the conceded errors. First, it concedes that trial counsel
(Trent Grant) gave Mr. Savage erroneous advice about whether he could be punished for trying
to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights in a related civil deposition.

However, the State’s

assertion that this Court should not worry about that error is meritless because it is based on facts
which the State has effectively conceded were not actually before the district court (the district
court did not grant the motion to take judicial notice of them). Moreover, when Mr. Grant’s
erroneous advice is actually considered in context, specifically the fact that it came before the
preliminary hearing, the prejudice it caused Mr. Savage is clear.
Second, the State concedes the district court’s only rationale for refusing to consider
Mr. Savage’s motion for reconsideration under I.R.C.P. 60(b) was erroneous. Again, the State
asks this Court to ignore that error based on an argument that is contrary to the applicable
precedent. Moreover, its arguments on the first issue actually only reinforce the conclusion that,
if this Court considers the merits of motion for reconsideration in the first instance, that motion
should have been granted.
Therefore, for any of the reasons the State has conceded, this Court should remand this
case for further proceedings.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Savage’s Appellant’s Brief.

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUES
I.

Whether the district court erred when it summarily dismissed Mr. Savage’s claim that he
only pled guilty as a result of Mr. Grant’s inaccurate and incomplete advice about his
Fifth Amendment rights.

II.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by refusing to consider Mr. Savage’s
motion for reconsideration because it had not been filed by the attorney who Mr. Savage
was alleging had abandoned the representation.

2

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Savage’s Claim That He Only Pled
Guilty As A Result Of Mr. Grant’s Inaccurate And Incomplete Advice About His Fifth
Amendment Rights
A.

Mr. Grant Gave Erroneous Advice In Multiple Respects, All Of Which Demonstrates
Deficient Performance, Though The State Only Concedes One Such Aspect
The State concedes that Mr. Grant gave Mr. Savage erroneous advice in one respect –

that the district court could sanction him if he tried to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights in the
civil deposition.

(Resp. Br., pp.10-11.)

That alone is sufficient to demonstrate deficient

performance under Strickland.1 However, the State tries to limit the scope of that issue by also
arguing that the rest of Mr. Grant’s advice was not actually erroneous. The State’s arguments in
those regards are mistaken.
First, the State argues that this Court should impliedly conclude that Mr. Grant told
Mr. Savage he could invoke his Fifth Amendment rights in the civil deposition hearing.
(Resp. Br., p.10.) As an initial matter, that is a wholly inappropriate inference to draw at the
summary dismissal stage, since the State is the moving party: “On review of a dismissal of a
post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary hearing, this Court will . . . liberally
construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” Johnson v. State,
162 Idaho 213, 217 (2017). In other words, to evaluate whether Mr. Savage, the non-moving
party, alleged sufficient facts to support his claim, “the Court draws all reasonable inferences in
favor of the non-moving party.” Parkinson v. Bevis, ___ P.3d ___, 2019 WL 4266089, *2
(2019), not yet final (emphasis added). Since, as discussed infra, there is also a reasonable
inference that trial counsel advised Mr. Savage that he could not invoke his Fifth Amendment
1

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
3

rights in the deposition, 2 this Court should refuse to consider the State’s implication in its review
of the summary dismissal order.
And even if the State’s proffered inference were a reasonable one (as discussed infra, it is
not), it still does not support the State’s argument to affirm the summary dismissal order. The
existence of contradictory inferences only demonstrates a genuine issue of material fact exists on
that point, and so, summary dismissal would still be inappropriate.

American Bank v.

Wadsworth Golf Const. Co of the Southwest, 155 Idaho 186, 190 (2013) (quoting G&M Farms v.
Funk Irr. Co., 119 Idaho 514, 516-17 (1991)); see, e.g., State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 388
(2013) (“Given the conflicting evidence as to whether counsel provided advice in advance of the
interview, we hold that Dunlap has demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
counsel’s performance was deficient . . . .”). Basically, despite the fact that the district court, “as
the trier of fact, may draw the most probable inferences form the undisputed evidence,” it cannot
cross the line and begin weighing conflicting evidence at the summary dismissal stage. Capstar
Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 153 Idaho 411, 416 (2012) (emphasis added). As such, all
accepting the State’s proffered inference would do is create conflicting inferences, and to resolve
that issue, the district court would have to weigh the inferences against each other. That means
an evidentiary hearing to develop those facts is still needed.
At any rate, the State’s proposed inference is not actually borne out by the record. See
Hap Taylor & Sons, Inc. v. Summerwind Partners, LLC, 157 Idaho 600, 612 (2014) (explaining
that, even if the district court might, at the summary dismissal stage, be properly trying to
2

In his argument in support of his motion for reconsideration under I.R.C.P. 60(b), Mr. Savage
actually alleged he could have alleged that Mr. Grant “specifically told me I could not plead the
5th in the civil deposition.” (R., p.247 (emphasis from original).) Therefore, even if this Court
accepts the State’s argument as the most probable inference based on the initial pleadings, doing
so would only prove that the district court’s refusal to consider Mr. Savage’s motion to
reconsider based on Mr. Taylor abandoning him was not harmless. (See Section II, infra).
4

determine which inference is the most probable, “the record must reasonably support those
inferences”). Most notably, in his affidavit, Mr. Grant himself did not state or imply that he told
Mr. Savage he could invoke his rights. (See generally R., pp.195-204.) In fact, that proposed
inference is wholly incompatible with Mr. Grant’s assertion that he warned Mr. Savage that he
would be sanctioned if he tried to invoke his rights. (See R., p.201.) The only reason to punish a
person for doing a thing is because he is not actually permitted to do that thing – when doing that
thing is not allowed. Therefore, the only reasonable inference to be drawn from Mr. Grant’s
affidavit is that, by telling Mr. Savage that he would be punished if the tried to invoke his Fifth
Amendment rights in the deposition, he was telling Mr. Savage that he could not invoke those
rights in the deposition.
The rest of Mr. Grant’s affidavit on this point only reinforces that conclusion.

He

explained that the question Mr. Savage had asked was “whether it would be appropriate for him
to ‘plead the 5th’” at the deposition, that “perhaps he could try to assert his constitutional rights
against self-incrimination and refuse to answer the questions.”

(R., p.201.)

Mr. Grant’s

explanation reveals he answered that question in the negative – that Mr. Savage would be forced
to answer the questions and that his answers would be admissible in the criminal case.
(R., p.201.) The only reasonable inference to be drawn from the answer that his assertion of his
rights would not be honored is that Mr. Grant was telling Mr. Savage he could not invoke his
rights at the civil deposition. Therefore, this Court should reject the State’s proposed inference
that Mr. Grant somehow properly advised Mr. Savage on that point. He did not.
Second, the State asserts in a footnote that since the supplemental petition asserts that
Mr. Grant’s advice – that answers in the deposition could likely be used against Mr. Savage in
the criminal case – Mr. Savage cannot show deficient performance on that basis.
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(Resp., Br., p.11 n.4.) The State’s argument takes that assertion out of context. The context for
that assertion was set by the claim in the supplemental petition – that trial counsel failed to
effectively advise Mr. Savage about his Fifth Amendment rights. (See R., p.180.) The United
States Supreme Court is clear that, if the defendant invokes the Fifth Amendment in a civil
deposition and is still forced to answer, the answers are not admissible in the criminal case.
Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 78 (1973). Therefore, unless Mr. Taylor were actively arguing
against Mr. Savage’s interests or had failed to review the controlling case law, the context of the
assertion demonstrates it was an assertion that statements made in a deposition without invoking
the Fifth Amendment are admissible in the criminal proceeding. 3
Because trial counsel gave erroneous advice – as demonstrated by clear United States
Supreme Court precedent and as conceded by the State on appeal (see App. Br., pp.8-12) –
Mr. Savage presented at least a genuine issue of material fact on the first prong of the Strickland
test.

B.

Trial Counsel’s Erroneous Advice Was Prejudicial Because It Directly Led To The Basis
Upon Which Mr. Savage Pled Guilty, And It Effectively Deprived Mr. Savage Of Any
Meaningful Opportunity To Engage In The Pretrial Process To Challenge The State’s
Other Evidence
The State’s prejudice argument is flawed in two respects. First, it is improperly based on

information which there is no indication the district court considered in ruling on the motion for
3

If the State is correct in this regard, that would completely undermine its position on the motion
for reconsideration. (See Section II, infra.) There, the State contends that, because Mr. Taylor
filed a motion to suppress that actually saved Mr. Savage’s claim in this regard, the record shows
no complete abandonment of meaningful representation. (Resp. Br., p.19.) However, if
Mr. Taylor actually undermined that claim by asserting, wrongly, that Mr. Grant had correctly
advised Mr. Savage that any statements at the deposition would be admissible regardless of
invoking the Fifth Amendment, that would affirmatively show that Mr. Taylor had utterly failed
to provide any meaningful representation to Mr. Savage. Therefore, if this Court accepts the
State’s argument in this regard, that would actually prove the district court’s refusal to consider
Mr. Savage’s motion for reconsideration under I.R.C.P. 60(b) was not harmless.
6

summary dismissal. Second, it ignores the scope and timing of the deposition as it related to the
pretrial processes. For both reasons, this Court should reject the State’s argument
To the first point, the State’s argument – that the rest of the State’s evidence discussed in
the presentence report shows a potential secondary consideration Mr. Savage could have taken
into account in his decision to plead guilty (Resp. Br., pp.12-14) – is improper because there is
no indication those facts were actually before the district court at the time it decided the motion
for summary dismissal. While both parties asked the district court to take judicial notice of
documents from the underlying record, including the PSI, there is no indication in the record that
the district court granted either of these motions. (See R., pp.9, 207; see generally R.) In fact, the
State actually conceded this point in its motion asking the Supreme Court to take judicial notice
of those documents. (Motion to Take Judicial Notice (filed 6/20/19), p.2.)
The fact that the parties referenced certain facts in their arguments is not enough to
actually put those facts before the district court. After all, the arguments of counsel are not
evidence.4 State v. Babb, 136 Idaho 95, 97 (Ct. App. 2001) (in which the State conceded the
district court improperly relied on the State’s assertions of fact in its brief below because those
facts had not ultimately been presented as evidence). Similarly, facts from the underlying
criminal case may not be relied on simply because they are in the personal recollected
knowledge of the court or the parties.

See Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 808 (1992).

Therefore, the fact that the parties specifically discussed those facts in their briefs is not
sufficient to put those facts before the district court or for the appellate courts to give those facts
any weight

4

In post-conviction, the allegations in the verified petition do constitute evidence because they
are the sworn allegations of fact made by the defendant-petitioner. Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588,
593 (Ct. App. 1993). The prosecutor’s motion does not function in the same way.
7

The Idaho Supreme Court recently made this clear. See Rome v. State, 164 Idaho 407
(2018). In that case, the appellant challenged the district court’s failure to take judicial notice of
certain documents from the underlying criminal case in his post-conviction proceedings. Id. at
413. He also argued that the language of the charging document (one of the documents which he
claimed should have been judicially noticed) showed that counsel was ineffective for not
requesting a lesser-included-offense instruction under the pleading theory. See id. at 417. In
other words, he argued the specific facts that would have been shown by the charging document.
See id. The Supreme Court held the district court did not err in denying the motion for judicial
notice. Id. at 414-16. As a result, it held the record was insufficient to support his claim under
the pleading theory because the charging document was not before the district court. Id. at 417.
In other words, it refused to consider the facts despite them being presented in the briefing
because they had not been properly before the district court. See generally id.
The same should be true in this case. Although the prosecutor referenced the PSI in his
briefing, the fact that his motion for judicial notice was not ultimately granted means those facts
were never before the district court. As a result, even though those facts appear in the appellate
record (see Order Re: Motion to Take Judicial Notice (dated 8/26/19)), they should not be given
any weight in evaluating the district court’s decision to summarily dismiss Mr. Savage’s petition.
However, as noted in Section A, supra, the existence of conflicting facts on a point only
demonstrates that there is a genuine issue of material fact requiring an evidentiary hearing.
American Bank, 155 Idaho at 190; Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 388. Since Mr. Savage alleged he pled
guilty based on the fact that he followed Mr. Grant’s erroneous advice and answered the
questions at the deposition, which Mr. Grant subsequently told him were sufficient by
themselves, to convict him, the fact that there might have been other, secondary considerations

8

for the guilty plea only creates a genuine issue material fact on this point. As such, Mr. Grant’s
erroneous advice affected Mr. Savage’s decision to plead guilty at the time he did (before the
preliminary hearing and any meaningful opportunity to challenge the State’s other evidence), and
that is the actual consideration for prejudice. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985)
McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847, 852 (2004). Even if Mr. Savage might ultimately have decided
to plead guilty in the face of the State’s other evidence after being able to meaningfully evaluate
whether there were any motions he could have filed to challenge that evidence, the erroneous
advice about the Fifth Amendment prejudiced Mr. Savage by leading him to plead guilty at the
initial appearance instead.
In effect, Mr. Grant’s advice was prejudicial because it deprived Mr. Savage of any
meaningful opportunity to take advantage of the pretrial process, during which he could examine
the State’s other evidence and potentially challenge it through motions in limine or suppression
motions. As the United States Supreme Court has recently clarified, prejudice under Strickland
is shown when “by the denial of the entire judicial proceeding to which [the defendant] had a
right.” Lee v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1965 (2017). As such, Mr. Savage
alleged sufficient facts to establish there was a nexus between trial counsel’s error and the
decision to plead guilty.
Mr. Savage agreed to waive his preliminary hearing and plead guilty at his initial
appearance in the district court as a direct result of him following Mr. Grant’s erroneous advice
about his Fifth Amendment rights.

That is because Mr. Savage, relying on Mr. Grant’s

erroneous advice, answered the deposition questions so as not to subject himself to the sanctions
Mr. Grant said would be forthcoming. That reliance on Mr. Grant’s erroneous advice is what
made his answers in the deposition admissible in the criminal case. Mr. Grant then advised

9

Mr. Savage to waive his preliminary hearing and plead guilty because those answers, by
themselves, were enough to convict him. This nexus demonstrates the prejudice caused by
Mr. Grant’s erroneous advice
Not recognizing this connection, and the fact that Mr. Savage did not have a meaningful
opportunity to challenge the State’s evidence in limine, the State also contends that, based on the
other evidence the State might have been able to present in this case, there was a disincentive to
Mr. Savage to stand on his right to a trial. That argument is improper at the summary judgment
stage because, like the State’s other argument, it asks this Court to draw inferences from the facts
in favor of the moving party. See Parkinson, ___ P.3d ___, 2019 WL 4266089; Johnson,
162 Idaho at 217. Thus, the inference that there might have been other considerations does not
affirmatively disprove Mr. Savage’s assertion that, but for Mr. Grant’s erroneous advice
regarding the deposition, he would not have pled guilty before he even had a meaningful
opportunity to review that other evidence to see if it might be contested. (See R., pp.17, 19.)
Therefore, Mr. Savage has established at least a genuine issue of material fact on that point, and
thus, summary dismissal of his petition was improper.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Refusing To Consider Mr. Savage’s Motion For
Reconsideration Because It Had Not Been Filed By The Attorney Who Mr. Savage Was
Alleging Had Abandoned The Representation
As with its argument on the first issue, the State concedes the main point, but maintains
that this Court should still affirm the district court’s erroneous decision despite that concession.
Specifically, the State concedes that the only basis on which the district court refused to consider
Mr. Savage’s motion to reconsider under I.R.C.P. 60(b) – that it was presented by Mr. Savage
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himself, rather than through the attorney he was claiming was not communicating with him –
was erroneous. (Resp. Br., pp.18-19.)

A.

This Court Should Reject The State’s “Right Result, Wrong Theory” Argument On The
Merits Of Mr. Savage’s Motion For Reconsideration Because It Did Not Raise The
Alternative Reasoning Below
The State contends that this Court should evaluate the merits of the motion, and as a

result, hold the district court’s erroneous refusal to consider the motion was harmless.
(Resp. Br., pp.15-21.) It makes this argument mindful of the Supreme Court’s decision in State
v. Hoskin, 165 Idaho 217, __, 443 P.3d 231 (2019)s, and of the fact that it did not actually
present any argument on the merits of Mr. Savage’s motion to reconsider below. (Resp. Br.,
p.19 & n.6.) It argues this is appropriate based on the idea that it did not have an opportunity to
respond to the motion – that this is the “not-uncommon situation where a district court rules on a
motion that the other party has not responded to.” (Resp. Br., p.19 n.6.) That inference is not
supported by the record – the State had some five months in which it could have filed a response
to Mr. Savage’s motion. (Compare R., p.226 (Mr. Savage’s motion for reconsideration filed on
December 14, 2017), with R., p.265 (the order refusing to consider the motion for
reconsideration, filed on May 17, 2018).) Therefore, even if there is some sort of equitable
exception to Hoskins for the case where the district court immediately rules on a party’s motion
without waiting for a response from the opposing party, it would not apply to this case.
However, Hoskins does not leave room that sort of exception in the first place: “This
Court has placed a premium on counsel presenting facts and law that it chooses to support its
position in the trial court. Our adversarial system of justice demands active and agile counsel at
all levels.” Hoskins, 443 P.3d at 240 (internal citation omitted). Thus, even if the district court
moves more quickly than the prosecutor to address a motion, the appellate courts still will not
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consider arguments or analyses which were clearly not before the district court in evaluating
whether the district court erred.
That conclusion is actually borne out by the fact that the Idaho Supreme Court has held
the remedy for errors such as this is to remand them for reconsideration under the proper legal
standards. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Montgomery, 147 Idaho 1, 6-7 (2009) (“When the discretion
exercised by a trial court is affected by an error of law, the role of the appellate court is to note
the error made and remand the case for appropriate findings.”). That is because such analyses
often involve questions of fact. See Andrus v. State, 164 Idaho 565, 567 (Ct. App. 2019)
(“A determination under I.R.C.P. 60(b) turns largely on questions of fact to be determined by the
trial court.”). As the Montgomery Court explained, the district court is far better situated to
resolve those questions of fact than the appellate court is. See, e.g., Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho
759, 770 (1986). Therefore, it would not be proper for this Court to address a factually-based
analysis that the district court has not already considered and ruled on. See Hoskins, 443 P.3d at
240. Besides, under that remedy, the State might still have the ability5 to actually raise whatever
arguments and present whatever facts it deems appropriate. Of course, Mr. Savage will then
have an opportunity to respond in kind. At that point, the district court will have the opportunity
to weigh those facts and rule on the merits of the motion in the first instance.
The State is trying to skip all those steps and have this Court decide this matter based on
arguments which the district court has not even considered due to its erroneous refusal to take up
the motion in the first place. The State contends that is proper because the Court of Appeals
conducted that sort of analysis in Bias v. State, 159 Idaho 696 (2015). (Resp. Br., p.19.) The

5

The State’s ability to raise such an argument on remand would likely depend on whether it
forfeited its opportunity to respond to the motion for reconsideration by failing to file a response
during the five months available while the motion was initially pending.
12

State is mistaken – Bias does not mention the concept of “right result, wrong theory” at all. See
generally Bias, 159 Idaho 696. That is because the district court in Bias actually considered the
merits of the petitioner’s motion under I.R.C.P. 60(b) when it ruled on his motion: “In deciding
whether to treat Bias’s ambiguous motion under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or 60(b),
the court considered the substance of the motion.” Bias, 159 Idaho at 701. Therefore, when the
Court of Appeals considered the merits of Mr. Bias’ motion under I.R.C.P. 60(b), it was directly
reviewing the analysis conducted by the district court, and so, did not involve a “right result,
wrong theory” analysis. See also Golub v. Kirk-Scott, Ltd., 157 Idaho 996, __, 342 P.3d 893,
896, 899-900 & n.4 (2015) (reviewing the merits of the motion which had actually been argued
by the parties in the district court, even though the district court ultimately ruled on procedural
grounds instead). Basically, when an issue is actually decided by the district court below, it is
properly preserved for appeal, and so, Hoskins is not implicated. See State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho
550, 553 (1998).
And even if the Bias Court were not directly reviewing the analysis the district court
conducted, that still would not excuse Hoskins’ preservation requirements. State v. Clinton, 155
Idaho 271, 272 n.1 (2013) (explaining that, when the Supreme Court issues an opinion, it does
not go back and try to locate prior decisions which are contrary to the new opinion; rather, it
simply expects lower courts to follow the law as announced in the new opinion).

Thus, to the

extent Bias or Golub conducted a “right result, wrong theory” analysis on a basis not argued
below, the State’s reliance on those cases would still be improper in light of Hoskins.
Either way, this Court should reject the State’s attempt to have it rule on an argument
which the State did not present below. Rather, this Court should remand this case so the district
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court can make the relevant factual determinations on Mr. Savage’s motion for reconsideration
under the proper legal standards. (See App. Br., p.15.)

B.

The District Court’s Erroneous Refusal To Consider The Motion For Reconsideration
Was Not Harmless
Should this Court do as the State is asking and consider the merits of Mr. Savage’s

motion for reconsideration in the first instance to determine whether the district court’s error was
harmless, it should still reject the State’s arguments. Mr. Savage’s motion for reconsideration
was viable, and so, the refusal to consider it affected his substantial rights.
As the Idaho Supreme Court explained in Eby v. State, because post-conviction is the
exclusive means for a person to raise certain constitutional challenges, cases where the appointed
post-conviction attorney abandons the petitioner may affect his substantial rights (although not
his Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel). 148 Idaho 731, 737 (2010). For example, postconviction petitioners have a due process right to notice of, and a meaningful opportunity to
respond to, defects in their petitions before they are summarily dismissed. See I.C. § 19-4906(b);
Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 676 (2010). When an appointed post-conviction attorney fails
to communicate with his client about the alleged defects, he effectively deprives his client of
both notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond. That problem is expressly evident in
Mr. Savage’s case, as he provided evidence of the responses he could have made, had his
attorney communicated with him, and those responses actually would have prevented summary
dismissal of his petition. (See App. Br., pp.16-17; see generally Resp. Br. (not contesting
Mr. Savage’s analysis in that regard).)
Rather, the State’s argument that Mr. Savage’s motion for reconsideration is meritless is
based on the idea that, because Mr. Taylor took some actions on Mr. Savage’s behalf, such as
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filing the amended petition, he could not be said to have completely abandoned Mr. Savage.
That argument is contrary to Eby, where the Supreme Court found a complete abandonment
despite the fact that post-conviction counsel had, like Mr. Taylor, started off doing what he was
supposed to do. Eby, 148 Idaho at 733 (noting that trial counsel initially informed the district
court that he had actually “conducted a ‘review, investigation, and research of post-conviction
issues,’” and informed the district court that an amended petition was forthcoming, before he
completely abandoned the petitioner). When counsel subsequently failed to take additional
actions, it was at that point he completely abandoned his client. See id.
Likewise, in Andrus v. State, post-conviction counsel took some actions on the
petitioner’s behalf, such as requesting an extension of time so that he could talk with his client
and actually sending him a letter.

Andrus v. State, 164 Idaho 565, 566 (Ct. App. 2019).

However, as the attorney in Andrus did nothing after that point (most notably, like Mr. Taylor,
failing to respond to the notice of intent to dismiss), the Court of Appeals held the defendant had
made a valid claim that the attorney had “completely abandoned” him at that point. See id. at
569-70. Thus, the fact that the post-conviction attorney completely abandons his client partway
through the proceedings is of no matter in terms of whether the petitioner has a meritorious claim
for relief under I.R.C.P. 60(b) in light of that abandonment. After all, he still suffers the same
prejudice in either case – dismissal of likely-meritorious claims of constitutional violations on
procedural grounds.
The State’s reliance on Devan v. State is also misplaced. In Devan, the evidence clearly
showed that the petitioner had actually acknowledged there were “multiple contacts between
[himself] and his counsel’s office reflecting ongoing communications,” and that he had, in fact,
met with his post-conviction attorney, at which time, his potential evidence was evaluated.
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Devan v. State, 162 Idaho 520, 523 (Ct. App. 2017). Moreover, at the ensuing hearing on the
motion for summary dismissal, the post-conviction attorney explained that, after talking with his
client, he “was unable to find any meritorious claims.” Id. As a result, the district court rejected
the petitioner’s claim that his attorney had abandoned him because “there was communication
between counsel and [Devan], specifically there was communication regarding the potential
alibi, and that counsel considered this information and determined there was no meritorious
claim.” Id. Based on that factual finding, the district court concluded “there was sufficient
communication between the parties and consideration of the issue by counsel that there was not a
complete lack of meaningful representation.” Id.
This case presents the antithesis of Devan.

Unlike Mr. Devan, who acknowledged

various communications between himself and counsel, Mr. Savage alleged there was no contact
whatsoever between Mr. Taylor and himself. (R., p.229.) Nothing in the record contradicts that
allegation. (See generally R.) In fact, because Mr. Taylor did not file a response to the motion
for summary dismissal, there was no hearing on that motion, which means, unlike the attorney in
Devan, Mr. Taylor did not offer any sort of explanation for his failure to respond to that motion.
(See generally R.) In short, there is nothing to suggest this case is anything like Devan.
As such, this is not a claim that expresses disagreement with Mr. Taylor’s assessment of
the case or that he was ineffective in the way he argued the case. Compare Devan, 162 Idaho at
523-24. Rather, this is one of those rare cases where post-conviction counsel completely failed
to provide any meaningful representation during the critical point in the proceedings. Compare
Eby, 148 Idaho at 737. Mr. Taylor, like the attorney in Eby, started out doing what he was
supposed to do (reviewing the case and seeking to amend the petition as needed), but then he,
like the attorney in Eby, failed to communicate any further with his client, and he did not take
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any further action in the case, thereby allowing his client’s viable claims to be summarily
dismissed. Thus, Mr. Savage’s motion for reconsideration had as much merit as the motion in
Eby.
As such, the district court’s refusal to consider Mr. Savage’s motion for reconsideration
was not harmless. Therefore, this Court should at least reverse the district court’s order refusing
to consider that motion.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Savage respectfully requests this Court reverse the order summarily dismissing his
petition and remand this case for further proceedings. Alternatively, he respectfully requests this
Court vacate or reverse the order refusing to consider his motion for reconsideration and remand
this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 16th day of September, 2019.
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